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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

FREDERICK VERNON WILLIAMS,  
et al.,

Defendant(s).

2:12-CR-463 JCM (VCF)

**ORDER**

Presently before the court is the matter of *United States v. Williams*, case no. 2:12-cr-463-JCM-VCF. This order addresses the following:

- Magistrate Judge Ferenbach's report and recommendation that defendant Frederick Williams' motion to suppress the search warrant be denied. (Doc. # 120).
- The magistrate judge's report and recommendation that Williams' motion to suppress involuntary statements be granted. (Doc. # 121).
- The magistrate judge's report and recommendation that defendant Jacqueline Gentle's motion to suppress the search warrant be denied. (Doc. # 128).
- The magistrate judge's report and recommendation that Williams' motion to dismiss the indictment be denied. (Doc. # 202).

- 1 • The magistrate judge's report and recommendation that Williams' motion to suppress
- 2 the search warrant be denied. (Doc. # 203).
- 3 • Williams' motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge's order denying his
- 4 motion to reopen bail. (Doc. # 220).
- 5 • Williams' motion for adoption of defense objections. (Doc. # 231).

## 6 **I. Background**

7 Williams is awaiting trial on charges of false citizenship, 18 U.S.C. § 911, false  
 8 statement in application for passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. §  
 9 1028A(a)(1), conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

10 On December 11, 2012, Agent Roland of the United States Diplomatic Security Service  
 11 applied for a search warrant for the premises located at 2637 Soledad Way, N. Las Vegas, Nevada  
 12 89030 (hereinafter "Soledad Way"), and two automobiles. The application/affidavit for search  
 13 warrant stated that a cooperating witness ("CW") provided information to Agent Roland relating to  
 14 defendant Williams and his co-defendants, and that "[t]he substantive information the CW provided  
 15 to me has been independently corroborated by various investigative methods and the CW has proved  
 16 to be reliable."

17 The search warrant application/affidavit identifies defendant Williams as "Subject 1," and  
 18 states that defendant Williams is alleged to have fraudulently obtained a U.S. passport using a  
 19 computer and finding a man who is a U.S. citizen with the same name as his father. The  
 20 application/affidavit also states that Williams is potentially involved in an unemployment  
 21 compensation fraud scheme, and provides the background of the investigation into such allegations.  
 22 The application/affidavit also discusses co-defendants and their involvement in the scheme. (*See*  
 23 application/affidavit for search warrant, doc. # 92-1).

24 The instant motions contest the validity of the warrant on numerous grounds, seek to dismiss  
 25 the indictment on numerous grounds, seek to suppress statements made upon interrogation, and  
 26 request to be released pending trial.

1 **II. Legal Standard**

2 *A. Reports and recommendations*

3 This court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or  
4 recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party timely objects  
5 to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, then the court is required to “make a *de novo*  
6 determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”  
7 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court is not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that  
8 is not the subject of an objection.” *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).

9 *B. Reconsideration and LR 3-1 objections*

10 A district judge “may reconsider any pretrial matter [adjudicated by the magistrate judge] .  
11 . . . where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”  
12 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); LR IB 3-1(a). The district judge may “affirm, reverse or modify, in whole  
13 or in part, the ruling made by the magistrate judge.” LR IB 3-1(b). Under the “clearly erroneous”  
14 standard, the magistrate judge’s ruling must be accepted unless, after a review of the record, the court  
15 is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *United States v.*  
16 *Silverman*, 861 F.2d 571, 576-77 (9th Cir.1998).

17 **III. Discussion**

18 Because defendant Frederick Williams is proceeding *pro se*, his filings are numerous and  
19 difficult to follow. The court has done its best to identify the salient points and will address each  
20 motion and argument in the manner most convenient for it.

21 *A. Report and recommendation on defendant Williams’ motion to suppress the search*  
22 *warrant*

23 The magistrate judge issued two reports recommending that Williams’ motions to suppress  
24 the search warrant be denied. (Docs. # 120, 203). Williams has objected to the reports and  
25 recommendations (docs. # 170, 214) and the government has responded (docs. # 179, 232).

26 The motions object to the sufficiency of the warrant issued for Soledad Way. Williams first  
27 argues that probable cause did not exist to justify the issuance of the warrant (doc. # 92) and later  
28

1 that the warrant was overbroad and was executed in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (doc. # 175).  
 2 Each argument is addressed in turn.

3 *I. Probable cause*

4 Williams contests whether there was probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime  
 5 would be found at the Soledad Way residence. In particular, Williams argues that Agent Roland set  
 6 forth facts indicating that he had knowledge that Williams had been involved in prior crimes;  
 7 however that his affidavit is insufficient to establish that specific objects connected to those  
 8 particular crimes would be located at Soledad Way. Williams' primary contention is that  
 9 investigation was conducted at the Congress Avenue residence<sup>1</sup>, but not enough was done with  
 10 regards to Soledad Way.

11 When issuing a search warrant, the magistrate judge is only required "to answer the  
 12 commonsense, practical question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or  
 13 evidence is located in a particular place." *United States v. Gourde*, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir.  
 14 2006)(quotations omitted). This court must pay "great deference" to the probable cause  
 15 determination made by the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant. *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S.  
 16 213, 236 (1983). Magistrate judges are entitled to draw "reasonable inferences about where evidence  
 17 is likely to be kept," and it is not required that the affidavit contain direct evidence that items are at  
 18 a particular location to establish probable cause regarding that location. *United States v. Angulo-*  
 19 *Lopez*, 791 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing *United States v. Jackson*, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.  
 20 1985)).

21 In analyzing the sufficiency of the application/affidavit and whether it justified probable  
 22 cause, the magistrate judge found as follows:

- 23 (1) the agents were working with a CW who was close to the  
 24 defendant [by marriage], (2) the information provided by the CW  
 25 regarding the allegations and defendant's prior residence was reliable,  
 (3) the CW had informed the agents that defendant Williams had

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26 <sup>1</sup> According to the CW, Williams had resided at 3123 Congress Ave., Las Vegas, NV 89121, when the  
 27 investigation began. On September 18, 2012, agents began conducting surveillance of that location. On December 6,  
 28 2012, the CW informed Agent Roland that Williams had moved to the Soledad Way residence, which the agents  
 thereafter surveilled. (Doc. # 92-1, p. 13-14).

1 moved to 2637 Soledad Way, (4) surveillance was conducted of the  
 2 residence, and (5) cars registered to defendant were seen outside the  
 residence for a twenty-four (24) hour period and at 3:00 a.m.

3  
 4 (Report and recommendation, doc. # 120, p. 7-8).

5 This court has independently reviewed the application/affidavit. (Doc. # 92-1). The court  
 6 agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that these averments contained within the  
 7 application/affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause that evidence of the alleged crimes  
 would be found at Soledad Way.

8  
 9 *ii. Overbreadth*

10 A warrant is sufficiently particularized if it establishes: (1) whether probable cause exists to  
 11 seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective  
 12 standards by which the executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which  
 13 are not; or (3) whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of  
 14 the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued. *United States v. Spilotro*, 800 F.2d  
 15 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). The warrant's description of items need only be "reasonably specific,  
 16 rather than elaborately detailed." *Id.* (citations omitted).

17 Williams argues the warrant is overbroad because the list of items to be seized provides, *inter*  
 18 *alia*, (1) passport and travel documents; (2) records and information relating to Luna Consulting; and  
 19 (3) records and information relating to Samuel Lopez, Kenneth Burchett, Bruce Forrester, Kyston  
 20 Patterson, Joel Collins, Maties Saravia, Keith Martin, Patrice Carter, Carolyn Willis, and Marcus  
 21 Liu.

22 Williams is charged with aggravated identity theft, false citizenship claims, and fraud. As  
 23 stated in the search warrant affidavit, Williams allegedly used his company, Luna Consulting, to  
 24 execute his scheme, which also allegedly involved the individuals listed. (*See* affidavit, doc. # 92-1).

25 In addition, the warrant identified Williams' home and car as places to be searched based on  
 26 information obtained from the C.W., along with Agent Rowland's experience, that Williams  
 27 possessed, manufactured, and sold fraudulent identification documents from his home and/or  
 28 vehicles. (*See* affidavit, doc. # 92-1, at 12-14).

1 This court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the warrant was sufficiently  
2 particularized. (*See* doc. # 203).

3 *iii. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41*

4 Williams alleges that the agents executing the warrant did not provide him with a copy nor  
5 did they tell him what he was being arrested for. Based on those allegations, Williams contends that  
6 the warrant violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) and evidence seized during the search should be  
7 suppressed.

8 “[S]uppression is rarely the proper remedy for a Rule 41 violation.” *United States v.*  
9 *Williamson*, 439 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006). “Only a fundamental violation of Rule 41 requires  
10 automatic suppression, and a violation is fundamental only where it, in effect, renders the search  
11 unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards.” *United States v. Johnson*, 660 F.2d  
12 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981).

13 “There are three circumstances under which evidence obtained in violation of [Rule 41]  
14 requires suppression: 1) the violation rises to a ‘constitutional magnitude;’ 2) the defendant was  
15 prejudiced, in the sense that the search would not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive  
16 if law enforcement had followed the Rule; or 3) officers acted in ‘intentional and deliberate  
17 disregard’ of a provision in the Rule.” *Williamson*, 439 F.3d at 1133 (*citing United States v.*  
18 *Martinez-Garcia*, 397 F.3d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.); *cert. denied*, 546 U.S. 901 (2005)).

19 Here, Williams has not alleged that the violation rises to a constitutional magnitude.  
20 Likewise, he has not alleged that he was prejudiced and the court finds no evidence of such upon its  
21 own review. Finally, there has been no evidence presented that the officers acted in intentional and  
22 deliberate disregard of the rule. (*See* motion to suppress, doc. # 175, p. 14-16). Accordingly, the  
23 court concludes that any violation of Rule 41 was a “mere technical error” which does not warrant  
24 suppression. *Williamson*, 439 F.3d at 1133.

25 Upon review of the arguments and the report and recommendation, the court finds the  
26 magistrate judge properly denied Williams’ motions to suppress (docs. # 92, 175). The report and  
27 recommendations (docs. # 120, 203) are adopted in their entireties.  
28

1           *B. Report and recommendation on defendant Williams' motion to suppress involuntary*  
 2           *statements*

3           Williams filed a motion to suppress involuntary statements (doc. # 91) to which the  
 4 government opposed (doc. # 118). After considering the briefing and holding a hearing on the  
 5 matter, the magistrate judge issued a report which recommended that Williams' motion be granted.  
 6 (Doc. # 121). The government did not file objections in response.

7           Where a party fails to object to a report and recommendation, the court is not required to  
 8 conduct "any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection." *Thomas v. Arn*,  
 9 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a district court is not  
 10 required to review a magistrate judge's report and recommendation where no objections have been  
 11 filed. *See United States v. Reyna-Tapia*, 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (disregarding the standard  
 12 of review employed by the district court when reviewing a report and recommendation to which no  
 13 objections were made); *see also Schmidt v. Johnstone*, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003)  
 14 (reading the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Reyna-Tapia* as adopting the view that district courts are not  
 15 required to review "any issue that is not the subject of an objection."). Thus, if there is no objection  
 16 to a magistrate judge's recommendation, then this court may accept the recommendation without  
 17 review. *See, e.g., Johnstone*, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (accepting, without review, a magistrate  
 18 judge's recommendation to which no objection was filed).

19           Nevertheless, this court finds it appropriate to engage in a de novo review to determine  
 20 whether to adopt the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge's ruling came  
 21 down to a credibility determination between the agent(s) who interviewed Williams and Williams  
 22 himself. The government has not objected to the magistrate judge's conclusion, apparently  
 23 conceding that the agents' versions of the interrogation are contradictory and that the conclusion that  
 24 Williams' testimony was more reliable was not in error. Accordingly, this court has no basis upon  
 25 which to reject the magistrate judge's credibility determination.

26           Upon reviewing the recommendation and underlying briefs, this court finds good cause  
 27 appears to ADOPT the magistrate's findings in full. The magistrate judge's report and  
 28

1 recommendation (doc. # 121) are adopted in their entirety and Williams' motion to suppress  
 2 involuntary statements (doc. # 91) is granted.

3 *C. Report and recommendation on defendant Gentle's motion to suppress*

4 Defendant Jacqueline Gentle has filed a motion to sever (doc. # 95) and motion to suppress  
 5 the search warrant (doc. # 94). The magistrate judge issued a report which denied the motion to  
 6 sever without prejudice and recommended that the motion to suppress be denied for lack of standing.  
 7 (Doc. # 128). Gentle has not filed objections in response.

8 Although not required to, *see Thomas*, 474 at 140, the court finds it appropriate to engage  
 9 in a de novo review to determine whether to adopt the recommendation of the magistrate judge.  
 10 Upon reviewing the recommendation and underlying briefs, this court finds good cause appears to  
 11 ADOPT the magistrate's findings in full.

12 The magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc. # 128) are adopted in their entirety  
 13 and Gentle's motion to suppress (doc. # 94) is denied.

14 *D. Report and recommendation on William's motion to dismiss the indictment*

15 The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that Williams' motion to dismiss the  
 16 indictment be denied. (Doc. # 202). Williams has objected (doc. # 213) and the government has  
 17 responded (doc. # 232).

18 Williams' multiple motions to dismiss the superseding indictments argue first that count  
 19 three of the indictment charging him with aggravated identity theft is barred by the statute of  
 20 limitations. Second, Williams argues that counts 8 through 23 should be dismissed for selective  
 21 prosecution, vindictive prosecution, and deporting a witness in violation of his due process rights.

22 With respect to Williams' argument regarding count three, the magistrate judge ruled as  
 23 follows:

24  
 25 Williams' argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,  
 26 under Rule 12, the court (1) takes the indictment's allegations as true,  
 27 *see Sampson*, 371 U.S. at 78–79, and (2) limits its review to the  
 28 indictment's four corners. *Boren*, 278 F.3d at 914. Here, the  
 indictment alleges that Williams violated 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A) "on or  
 about January 30, 2008, through on or about March 3, 2009." (*See*



1 Second Super. Indict. (#142) at 2:11–12). Under Rule 12, this is  
 2 sufficient because Williams was indicted on December 11, 2012,  
 3 which is within the five-year state of limitations. (*See* Indict. #1).  
*Hamling*, 418 U.S. at 117.

4 Second, Williams’ argument regarding “use” is unpersuasive  
 5 because the court cannot consider evidentiary questions on a Rule 12  
 6 motion to dismiss. *See* FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b); *Jensen*, 93 F.3d at 669  
 7 (citation omitted) (“A motion to dismiss the indictment cannot be  
 8 used as a device for a summary trial of the evidence”).

9 (Report and recommendation, doc. # 202, p. 3).

10 The magistrate judge’s ruling was correct because “the court should not consider evidence  
 11 not appearing on the face of the indictment.” *Jensen*, 93 F.3d at 670 (*quoting United States v.*  
 12 *Marra*, 481 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1973)). As a result, Williams’ dispute with regards to  
 13 the dates in question that encompass this charge may not be considered by the court at this time.

14 Turning next to Williams’ arguments regarding counts 8 through 23, the magistrate judge  
 15 correctly concluded that the inclusion of these counts do not violate Williams’ due process rights.

16 First, Williams has not sufficiently demonstrated that the government has sought additional  
 17 charges solely to punish him for exercising his constitutional or statutory rights. *See United States*  
 18 *v. Hernandez-Herrera*, 283 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001). Williams’ bare allegations that the  
 19 superseding indictments have been brought solely because he exercised his “right to seek pretrial  
 20 release, voluntary departure to Belize, right to dismiss counsel, right to proceed *pro se*, right to trial,  
 21 right to apply for bail, and right to challenge his immigration order of removal” (doc. # 176, p. 5)  
 22 are not supported by “direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of  
 23 such.” *United States v. Montoya*, 45 F.3d 1286, 1299 (9th Cir. 1995).

24 Next, Williams’ argument that the government is selectively prosecuting him is not supported  
 25 by any credible evidence that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted or that the  
 26 prosecution is based on an impermissible motive. *See United States v. Wayte*, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th  
 27 Cir. 1983). His subjective belief that he and/or his family are being impermissibly targeted is simply  
 28 not evidence. Accordingly, the magistrate judge correctly rejected this argument.

Finally, Williams has failed to make a plausible showing that the deportation of a potential

1 witness, Joel Collins, “would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely  
2 cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses” and that “there was a reasonable likelihood that  
3 the testimony would have affected the judgement.” *United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal*, 458 U.S.  
4 858, 872-73 (1982); *United States v. Cervantes-Gaitan*, 792 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1986).

5 Upon review of the underlying motions, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations,  
6 and the objections thereto, the court hereby adopts the report and recommendations (doc. # 202) in  
7 their entireties. Williams’ motion to dismiss the indictment (doc. #176) is denied.

8 *E. Williams’ motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order declining to*  
9 *reopen bail*

10 Williams seeks reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion to reopen  
11 bail. (Doc. # 220). The government has filed a response in opposition. (Doc. # 228).

12 Following indictment, the magistrate judge ordered the defendant released on personal  
13 recognizance with certain conditions. Williams was thereafter was taken into custody by ICE on a  
14 detainer.

15 On January 23, 2013, the government filed a petition regarding defendant’s pretrial release  
16 status (doc. # 23) wherein it asserted that the defendant had appeared before an immigration judge  
17 and stated he wished to be voluntarily deported to his country of birth, Belize. Following defendant’s  
18 arrest on the petition, he was detained pending a revocation hearing. (Doc. # 37).

19 At the revocation hearing, the government further alleged that, in 2004, Williams had  
20 submitted a false application to the Nevada DMV wherein he listed his country of birth as St. Croix,  
21 Virgin Islands. It was also alleged that the defendant told the immigration judge that he wished to  
22 take his mother with him back to Belize.

23 The government argued that, based on Williams’ multiple conflicting accounts of his place  
24 of birth and his expressed desire to return to Belize, he is a “fraudster” who cannot be trusted to  
25 comply with his pretrial release conditions, in particular his travel restrictions. Based on these  
26 representations, the magistrate judge concluded that the defendant posed a flight risk and ordered  
27 him detained.  
28

1 Most of the arguments before the magistrate on the motion to reopen bail centered around  
2 what, specifically, Williams told the immigration judge regarding his desire to return to Belize. The  
3 parties represented to the magistrate that a transcript of those proceedings was not available, but one  
4 could be obtained in several weeks. The magistrate judge indicated he would be open to revisiting  
5 the issue with the benefit of the record of the immigration proceedings before him.

6 Apparently unhappy with that time frame, the defendant has filed the instant motion, which  
7 further requests that the court listen to the oral record of those proceedings in lieu of reviewing the  
8 written transcripts.

9 The defendant has recently filed a “brief” in which he argues that he never made those  
10 statements. (Doc. # 237). The recording Williams has marked as exhibit one—in addition to not  
11 being properly authenticated—supports the government’s contentions. When asked by the  
12 immigration law judge what the status of his citizenship is, Williams attempted to “waive” his  
13 United States citizenship, admitted he is a citizen of Belize, and requested to be voluntarily departed  
14 so that he may gather his family to take with him. (Doc. # 237, ex. 1, track 3 at appx. 2:55). In  
15 response to a question posed by the judge, Williams also specifically confirms that he desires to  
16 return to Belize with his mother. (*Id.*, track 6 at appx. 3:30-50). It should be noted that members  
17 of his family—in particular his wife, sister, and brother—are co-defendants in the instant case.

18 Based on the representations made by Williams, the government, and the nature of the  
19 offenses as charged in the indictment, the court is unable to conclude that the magistrate judge’s  
20 order denying the motion to reopen bail is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. §  
21 636(b)(1)(A); *see also Silverman*, 861 F.2d at 576 (discussing clearly erroneous standard and holding  
22 a ruling must be accepted in absence of a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been  
23 committed.”). Williams’ motion for reconsideration (doc. # 220) is therefore denied.

24 *F. Williams’ motion for adoption of defense objections*

25 Williams filed a motion titled “adoption of defense objections” (doc. # 231) in connection  
26 with his previously filed objections (docs. # 213, 214) to the magistrate judge’s reports and  
27 recommendations.  
28

1 Williams has repeatedly alleged that the government is vindictively prosecuting him based  
2 on the filing of multiple superseding indictments. This motion essentially requests the court adopt  
3 his objections to the reports and recommendations on the basis that the government inadvertently  
4 failed to respond to his objections on time.

5 The motion is denied. The government has fully briefed each issue in front of the magistrate.  
6 Further, the government obtained favorable rulings on these motions and is not required to file a  
7 reply to his objections in any event.

8 **IV. Conclusion**

9 In summary, Williams' motions to suppress the search warrant, dismiss the indictment,  
10 reconsider the magistrate judge's order, and adopt defense objections are each denied. Williams'  
11 motion to suppress involuntary statements is granted. Defendant Jacqueline Gentle's motion to  
12 suppress is denied.

13 Accordingly,

14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the magistrate judge's  
15 reports and recommendations (docs. # 120, 203) be, and the same hereby are, ADOPTED in their  
16 entireties. Williams' motions to suppress the warrant (docs. # 92, 175) are hereby DENIED.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc.  
18 # 121) be, and the same hereby are, ADOPTED in their entireties. Williams' motion to suppress  
19 involuntary statements (doc. # 91) is hereby GRANTED.

20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc.  
21 # 128) be, and the same hereby are, ADOPTED in their entireties. Jacqueline Gentle's motion to  
22 suppress (doc. # 94) is hereby DENIED.


23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc.  
24 # 202) be, and the same hereby are, ADOPTED in their entireties. Williams' motion to dismiss the  
25 indictment (doc. # 176) is hereby DENIED.

26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties' joint motion to review recordings in lieu of  
27 transcripts (doc. # 212) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams' motion for reconsideration (doc. # 220) be, and  
2 the same hereby is, DENIED.

3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams' motion for adoption of defense objections (doc.  
4 # 231) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

5 DATED May 30, 2014.

6  
7   
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE